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Carter v. State, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 26 (April 25, 2013)1 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—MIRANDA, DUE PROCESS, FIFTH AMENDMENT, 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
 
Summary 
 
Whether a suspect who asks, “Can I get an attorney?” after he has been advised of his 
rights under Miranda2, unambiguously invokes his right to counsel, and if so, whether the State 
can resume the interrogation of the suspect by reading him a second set of Miranda warnings and 
obtaining an otherwise valid waiver. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
The question “Can I get an attorney?” is an unequivocal request for the aid of counsel, 
triggering the requirement that all interrogation immediately cease. Also, once a suspect invokes 
his right to counsel, there may be no further interrogation unless the suspect reinitiates contact 
with the police, there is a sufficient break in custody, or the suspect is provided the aid of the 
counsel that he requested. 
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
Appellant Christopher Carter’s convictions stem from an investigation by the Las Vegas 
Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD), in conjunction with the FBI, into a series of 
robberies. Law enforcement suspected that the robberies were related, but theorized that more 
than one man was responsible due to witnesses’ varying descriptions of suspects’ heights and 
weights, and reports of waiting escape vehicles. When a witness identified a black Mazda Miata 
as the escape vehicle for one of the robberies, FBI agents searched DMV records and came up 
with Carter as a possible suspect. At the police station, Carter confessed to multiple robberies, 
burglaries, and possession of a firearm. Ultimately, a jury found Carter guilty of eight counts of 
burglary while in possession of a firearm, twelve counts of robbery with the use of a deadly 
weapon, and one count of coercion.  
 
Carter moved to suppress his confession prior to trial, claiming that interrogation began 
after he invoked his right to counsel. The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing where 
Detective Joel Martin testified that while escorting Carter to the police station after his arrest, he 
advised Carter of his rights under Miranda. According to Martin, during the drive, Carter 
expressed “concern” about hiring an attorney, and although Martin could not recall exactly what 
was said, he did not interpret it as a demand for an attorney. Martin admitted that Carter could 
have asked, “Can I get a lawyer?” or “Can I get an attorney?” Carter testified that he asked 
Detective Martin, something like “Can I get a lawyer?” and was requesting an attorney, and 
Martin replied that they could talk about it later. During argument, the State conceded that Carter 
asked either “Can I have a lawyer?,” “May I have a lawyer?,” or “Can I have my lawyer?,” and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 By Brittany Puzey 
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
framed the issue before the district court, stating: “This whole case, or this whole motion, comes 
down to one thing: Can I have an attorney? Is that question, is that an unequivocal request to I’m 
not speaking to you unless I have my attorney?”  
 
The district court found that Carter asked “Can I get an attorney?” and denied the motion 
to suppress his confession, concluding that (1) Carter’s statement was ambiguous, and (2) there 
was no substantive questioning until after Carter was given a second set of Miranda warnings at 
the police station and waived his right to counsel. 
 
Discussion 
 
On appeal, Carter contended that the district court erred in denying the motion to 
suppress his confession, arguing that it was obtained in violation of Miranda and was therefore 
inadmissible as a matter of law. 
 
 In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court determined that the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments’ prohibition against self-incrimination required that any interrogation of a suspect 
in custody “be preceded by advice to the putative defendant that he has the right to remain silent 
and also the right to the presence of an attorney.”3 In Edwards, the Court added a ‘second layer’ 
of protection, so that once a suspect invokes the right to counsel under Miranda, he cannot be 
subject to further interrogation and all questioning must cease until counsel has been made 
available to him.4 To determine whether, under Edwards, all interrogation must cease, a court 
must first “determine whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel.”5 
 
“Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel ‘requires, at a minimum, some statement that 
can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.’”6 
However, “if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a 
reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect 
might be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of 
questioning.”7 “Second, if the accused invoked his right to counsel, courts may admit his 
responses to further questioning only on finding that he (a) initiated further discussions with the 
police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked.”8 
 
Whether Carter invoked his right to counsel 
 
Following Edwards, the court first determined whether Carter’s statement “Can I get an 
attorney?” is an unequivocal demand for counsel, requiring that all questioning immediately 
cease until counsel is present, or is merely an ambiguous inquiry into the extent of his rights. The 
court concluded that Carter’s statement was an unambiguous and unequivocal request for the 
assistance of counsel during questioning. The court considered the words used and the 
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7 Id. 
8 Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 (1984) (per curiam) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
circumstances in which they were spoken, to find that Carter expressed his desire for the 
assistance of an attorney, and a reasonable officer would have understood it as such.  
 
The fact that shortly thereafter Carter communicated that he was merely “concerned” 
about an attorney did nothing to alter the decision. Once a suspect requests an attorney, Miranda 
and its progeny do not allow police officers to subtly interrogate the suspect under the guise of 
clarifying intentions that are already clear. Here, Carter clearly expressed that he would like the 
assistance of an attorney in dealing with the police. His words were unequivocal and 
unambiguous and his request should have been honored. 
 
Policy 
 
To hold that a suspect who asks “Can I get an attorney?” does not invoke his right to 
counsel would suggest that no statement phrased as a question could invoke one’s right to 
counsel—a holding contrary to law and lacking a fundamental understanding of the nature of 
human interaction. 
 
Whether Carter’s waiver was valid 
 
The court then determined whether Carter validly waived his right to counsel. Edwards 
makes abundantly clear that once counsel is requested, all questioning must immediately cease, 
and the right may only be waived if (1) the accused initiates subsequent communication, (2) 
there is a break in custody, or (3) he receives the counsel that he asked for—none of which 
occurred here. Once an accused expresses his desire to confer with counsel, there are no actions 
that police officers can take to revive questioning other than honoring that request. Because 
Carter’s confession was an uncounseled response to questioning that occurred after he invoked 
his right to counsel, it must be suppressed regardless of whether his subsequent waiver was 
otherwise valid.  
Because Carter’s confession was the linchpin in the case against him, the admission was 
not harmless.9 Absent his confession, the entirety of the evidence against Carter was his 
ownership of a vehicle consistent with one seen leaving the scene of a robbery, ownership of a 
firearm consistent with one used during the robberies, and the discovery of a white T-shirt with 
eyeholes cut out of it consistent with a facial covering used by the suspect at two robberies. No 
other physical or testimonial evidence placed Carter at any of the robberies.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Appellant’s confession was inadmissible, because the error in admitting the confession is 
not harmless. Judgment of conviction reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with the opinion. 
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